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[L. A. No. 20369. In Bank. Oct. 1, 1948.J 
PAUL W. SAMPSELL, JR., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Mandamus-To Courts-Compelling Entertaining of Jurisdlc-
tIon.-Mandamus is available to compel a court to give a full 
hearing in the case before it, although the remedy is not 
available to inform thEl court as to how it should rule with 
respect to the merits of the case. 
[2] Id.-Existence of Other Remedy-Appeal-The fact that an 
order of dismissal is appealable does not necessarily preclude 
a resort to mandamus, since an appeal is not always a speedy 
or adequate remedy. 
[8] Id.-Existence of Other Remedy-AppeaL-An appeal from 
an order dismissing a proceeding with respect to the custody 
of a child pending a divorce action would not be an adequatt' 
[1] Mandamus to compel court to assume or exercise jurisdiction 
where it has erroneously dismissed the cause or refused to proceed 
on the ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction, notes, 4 A.L.R. 582; 
82 A.L.R. 1163. See, also, 16 Cal.Jur. 819; 35 Am.Jur. 25. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] ?tlundamus, § 37; [2] Mandamus, 
§l5(3); [3J Manuamus, § 15(5); [4J Appearance, § 22; r5, 6] 
Courts, § 66; [7,9,11] lli"Qrce, ~ 272; [8,10] Divorce, § 285. 
) 
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remedy barring mnndamns WhC'TC thC' trial court in the principal 
action bad refused to grant petit.ion('r a bearing with respect 
to tbe custody of tbe child rrgaTrlless of the relative fitness 
of himself or the defendant and regllrdless of th(' interests 
of the cbild, and where a denial of tbe writ would require 
petitioner to await the outcome of the principal action before 
perfecting his appeal. 
[4] Appearance-General Appearance-Effect.-A defendant who 
answers plaintiff's complaint on the merits waives any claim 
of lack of jurisdiction over her. 
[5] Oourts-Jurisdiction-Acquisition.-An appearance by an-
swering a complaint does not confer jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the action, for such jurisdiction may not 
be waived by a party or conferred on the court by consent. 
[6] ld.-Jurisdiction--Acquisition.-A party cannot confer on a 
court jurisdiction over the subject matter that it does not 
already have. 
[7] Divorce-Oustody of Ohildren-Jurisdiction.-When a child of 
parents who have separated is living in one state but is domi-
ciled in another, tbe courts of each state may have jurisdiction 
over the question of its custody, though the courts of one state 
may determine that the other state has a more substantial in-
terest in the child and leave the matter to be settled there. 
[8] ld.-Oustody of Ohildren-Extraterritorial Effect of Judgment. 
-As a matter of comity valid custody decrees of the courts 
of sister states are treated with the same respect as custody 
decrees of California courts. 
(9) ld.-Oustody of Ohildren-Jurisdiction.-It is a sufficient 
basis for jurisdiction of a proceeding with respect to the cus· 
tody of a child that the state has a substantial interest in the 
welfare of the child or in the preservation of the family unit 
of which he is a part, and this jurisdiction may exist in two 
or more states at the same time. 
[10] ld.-Oustody of Ohildren-Extra.territorial Effect of Judg-
ment.-A decree o~ a sister-state court awarding to a parent 
the custody of a child which has its domicile in California, 
does not deprive the California courts of jurisdiction over the 
child, for the state of domicile has as substantial an interest 
in the child's welfare as a state in which the child's presence 
was merely temporary. 
(11) ld.-Oustody of Ohildren-Jurisdiction.-A California court 
which had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
custody of a child while the child was domiciled within the 
8tate, is not deprived thereof by the fact that the child is living 
in another state. 
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pnOCEEDTNG in mandamus to compel superior court to 
hcar an application for order awarding petitioner custody of 
child pending a divorce action. Writ granted. 
McLaughlin, McGinley & Hanson and J. A. McLaughlin 
for Petitioner. 
Martin S. Ryan, Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and 
Douglas De Coster, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, plaintiff in a divorce action 
pending in respondent court, seeks a writ of mandamus to 
compel respondent to hear his application for an order pen-
dente lite awarding him custody of thl.' minor child of plaintiff 
and defendant. 
The parties to the divorce action were married in 1941 and 
have one child, born on September 13, 1944. The child lived 
with both parents in this state in the county of Los Angeles 
until June 3, 1946, when the parents separated. The child 
continued to live in California with defendant, his mother, 
until October 25, 1946, when she left California taking the 
child with her. Thereafter they lived in Nevada until June 
7,1947. Since that date they have lived in Utah. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in respondent 
court on January 2, 1947, seeking a divorce, custody of the 
minor child, and a division of the community property. The 
substance of plaintiff's complaint is as follows: Defendant 
took the child out of the state without plaintiff's knowledge 
or consent and established a temporary abode for herself and 
the child in a motor court in Las Vegas, Nevada. On Deeem-
ber 11, 1946, defendant filed an action for divorce in Nevada, 
fraudulently claiming to be domiciled within that state, al-
though in fact she intended to remain there only long enough 
to obtain a divorce and then to marry William Holt, a resi-
dent of Utah. Plaintiff was not personally served with process 
in the Nevada action. Plaintiff elairus that he is a fit person 
to have custody of the child and that defendant is not. 
Defendant was not personally served in California in the 
California divorce action; but on April 4, 1947, Rhe appeared 
through !,ler attorney and filed an answer. In her answer she 
alleged that on February 4, 1947, she obtained a Nevada 
decree of divorce and was also awarded custody of the child. 
She also allrged that she is entitled to all of the community 
) 
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property of the parties and requested the court to award this 
property to her. 
011 July 8, 1947, plaintiff applied to respondent court for 
an order pendente lite awarding him custody of the child 
pending trial of the California action. Plaintiff's affidavit 
states that plaintiff and defendant were residents of the 
county of Los Angeles, State of California, when defendant 
took the child out of the county of Los Angeles on October 
25, 1946, without plaintiff's knowledge and consent; that 
defendant informed him before she left that she intended to 
obtain a Nevada divorce and then to marry William Holt, 8 
resident of Utah. Before defendant had obtained a Nevada 
divorce, plaintiff, on January 2, 1947, brought an action for 
divorce and custody of the minor child of the parties. At that 
time, under the provisions of Government Code. section 244, 
all three persons, plaintiff, defendant, and the minor child. 
were domiciled in California. Subsequently on February 4th, 
1947, defendant obtained an allegedly invalid Nevada divorce. 
On June 7, 1947, she married William Holt, and since that 
time she and the child have been living in Utah. Plaintiff 
filed the application for an order pendente lite in respondent 
court on July 7th, 1947, alleging the foregoing facts and 
that neither defendant nor William Holt are fit persons to 
have the custody of the child and that he has in effect been 
denied even the right to see his child. An order to show 
cause why the order requested should not be issued, or, in 
the alternative why plaintiff should not have reasonable 
visitation rights, was served on defendant's attorneys, who 
had made a general appearance in the principal action. On 
the date on which the order to show cause was returnable 
defendant appeared tl1rough her attorney and made a motion 
to dismiss the proceeding with respect to the custody of the 
child, on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction. De-
fendant contended that respondent court lacks jurisdiction 
because the child was not in tlle State of California at the 
time of the hearing and has not been here at any time since 
the plaintiff filed his dh'orce complaint on January 2, 1947. 
The court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the 
order to show cause" for lack of jurisdiction." 
Plaintiff thereupon filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
to compel respondent court to proceed with the hearing. 
Respondent court and defendant, as rea] party in interest, 
jointly filed points and authorities in opposition to the peti-
tion for writ of mandamus, stating that, "The respondent 
) 
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eourt refused to p,'occ('(1 lI,i'" Ih" hl'flrillU of the application 
1o determine clIs/ody oj' 1/1" ,.IIil" 011 fTll' ~o', urollnd tllat it 
had no jurisdirfion to do so, uasell lIrOIl tlw aflirllllltiv(> farts 
set forth in till' affidavit of petitionl'r in support of the order 
to show cause, which affidaYit of the petitioner showed on its 
faee that defendant and the minor child were physica lly out-
side of the State of California before the commencement of 
the action, and at all times subsequent to the commencement 
of the action. , .. 
"The attorney for the defendant, Martin S. Ryan, appeared 
at the date set for the hearing on the order to show cause 
re custody, and at said time made a mot.ion on behalf of the 
defendant to dismiss the order to show cause for lack of juris-
diction. This motion was granted because it appeared that the 
court did not have jurisdiction, for the reasons hereinabove 
set forth and by reason of the law pertaining to the factual 
situation, as hereinafter cited. 
"Petitioner st.ates that the issuance of a writ of mandate 
is proper wherever the court refuses to exercise jurisdiction 
in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction. There seems 
to be no question but what this is the law, but it does not 
apply in this case for the reason that it iR the contention of 
the reRpondents that respondent court at no time had juriRd1'c-
tion to make any order regarding the cURtody of the minor 
child . ... 
"The court not having .1uriRd1·ction originally in the case 
at bar nor jurisdiction at the time of the hearing of the order 
to Rhow cause, the respondent court rightfully Ilranted the 
motion of respondent Gladys J. Sampsell because the respond-
ent court could not assume jurisdiction a.c; appeared in the 
pleadings when they showed to the contrary." (Italics added.) 
This court granted t.he alternative writ in order to determine 
whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to continue 
with the proceeding. Respondent court and defendant, as 
real party in interest, have jointly filed a demurrer to the 
alternative writ on the ground that the superior court does 
not have jurisdiction to make a custod;v award of a minor child 
when that child has not been within the state during the 
pendency of the action. 
The question has arisen whrther mandamus is the 
proper remedy by which plaintiff may test the correctl1l'!'1S 
of the trial court's ruling" tllat it has no jurisrlictiol1 OYl'r the 
custody of the child. It has bl'('/J suggested tbat the rule 
1 
J 
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laicl down ill Unrofn \'. SlIW"ilJr Cml"l, 32 Ca1.2d 304 {l3!1 
P.!!ri ]:31, il'; cOlltroJ]ing on this C]lH'stion and that mandamul' 
is not available. 
In the Lincoln case the question of the availability of man-
damus depended on "two controverted issues of fact which 
are to bc determined upon the sufficiency of the evidence (the 
record of the proceedings in the trial court) to establish the 
allegations of the petition. The dispute is not as to the 
substance, but only as to the effect of such evidence. Such 
issues are: (1) The petition alleges (and the answer in proper 
form denied all the averments) 'That said superior court 
refused to hear or consider, and has not heard or considered 
said motion ... or said order to show cause, and has held 
that it has no jurisdiction to hear or determine said motion 
or determine whether said plaintiff is entitled to relief thereby 
sought and will not do so unless required by order and man-
date of this Court; (2) the petition alleges (and the answer 
in proper form denies the averments) 'That petitioner has 
no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law ... .' We find 
the record insufficient to sustain petitioner in either of the 
controverted issues." (Lincoln v. Superior Court, supra, at 
306-307.) 
In the present case we have no controverted issues of fact. 
The plaintiff has alleged, and the respondent court and defend-
ant have conceded, that the trial court did not give a hearing 
on the merits but "refused to proceed with the hearing on 
the application to determine custody of the child on the sole 
ground that it had no jurisdiction to do so, based on the 
affirmative facts set forth in the affidavit of petitioner in 
support of the order to show cause, which affidavit of peti-
tioner showed on its face that the defendant and the minor 
child were physically outside ofiheState of California before 
the commencement of. the action, and at all times subsequent 
to the commencement of the action .•.. " (Respondent's 
Points and Authorities, pp.1-2.) 
This court in the Lincoln case determined that petitioner 
had been given a hearing on the merits. In that case the 
petitioner had commenced an action against her husband for 
srparate maintenance in a California superior court, and 
that court issued an order to show cause with reference to 
temporary support. The defendant appeared on the date 
srt for hearing and flIed an affidavit. supported by the 
exemplified r('cords of a Virginia court, showing that petiti01wr 
had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Virginia 
) 
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t~Ollrl. ill all action for lIi\'or(~c and that an order for her 
~upport made by the Virginia court in that. action was being 
complied with by defendant. 'rllt' defcJulaJit thereupon filed 
a motion, based on these facts, to vacate and set aside the 
order to show cause on two grounds: (1) Lack of jurisdiction 
to proceed because of the pendency of the Virginia action; 
(2) the Virginia proceeding was res judicata. This court 
held that "Neither of such grounds raises a jurisdictional 
point .... The fact that the plaintiff was then receiving 
support from the defendant pursuant to a court order was, 
however, material evidence upon the hearing. (See Smith v. 
Smith (1905), 147 Cal. 143 [SI P. 411].) The order to show 
cause came on for hearing upon the complaint and plaintiff's 
affidavit upon which the order had been issued, and upon 
defendant's showing in opposition as heretofore set forth . 
•• After receiving the evidence of the parties, as above 
related, the superior court made an order which is reflected 
in its minutes as follows: 'Order to Show Cause re Alimony 
Pendente Lite, Costs, Attorney's Fees and Restraining Order 
comes on for hearing; ... Defendant's motion to quash and 
Dismiss is granted.' (Italics added.) Petitioner now contends 
that the trial court, by the action aboye related, refused to 
e:eercise its jurisdiction to hear and determine the order to 
show cause, and seeks the mandate of this court to compel 
the superior court 'at a specified time and place, to set said 
order to show cause . . . for immediate hearing and to de-
termine said matter on its merits.' The answer to petitioner's 
demand is that the superior court has exercised its jurisdiction 
and has conducted a hearing on the merits. Whether its order 
was erroneous is not now before us." (Ibid. at 30S, italics by 
the court.) 
"In the case out of which this proceeding arose, the defe'Ad-
ant's motion to dismiss and the evidence whick he presented 
to the trial court did not constitute a mere objection to the 
jurisdiction of such court. On the contrary, such procedure 
was a challenge on the merits to the plaintiff's application and 
called for an affirmative exercise of jurisdiction by the 
court .... 
"As shown by the record, the trial court conducted a hear-
ing on the mooted· order to show cause. It had before it and 
receh'ed the proofs both of plaintiff and of defendant. It con-
sidered such proofs, gave to them ",hat it thought was their 
proper legal eiTt'ct, and made itR or(l"r dismissing the proc~ed-
S2 C.2d-16 
) 
) 
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jng. This WH!;, jllrisclil'1imwlly, a eomplrtc trial of such 
proc('cding." (Ibid. at. a14, italiC's acldt'd.) 
In the prC'sent case the ddendant presented no evidence 
or counteraffldavits. Her motion was not a ehallcnge on the 
merits; it ,vas based on the sole ground that the court lacked 
jurisdiction because the child waf~ not physically prt'sent 
within the State of California at the time the action was 
commenced or at any time during the pendency of the action. 
The trial court heard no evidence and refused to consider 
the merits of the case before it; it looked at the affidavit of 
petitioner solely to determine its own jurisdiction. If we were 
to hold that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction based on 
the facts stated in petitioner's affidavit is a determination 
on the merits precluding the issuance of mandamus, the 
following cases among others would have to be overruled: 
Temple v. Superior Court,70 Cal. 211 [11 P. 699] ; Hennessy 
v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 368 [228 P. 862] ; Times Mirror 
Co. v. Superior Court,3 Cal.2d 309, 312 [44 P.2d 547] ; Cahill 
v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. 42, 44·45 [78 P. 467] ; Miller v. 
Mu.nicipal Court, 22 Cal.2d 818, 852 [142 P.2d 297]; Levy 
v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692 [104 P.2d 770, 129 A.L.R. 
956] ; Katenkamp v. 8uperior Court, 16 Cal.2d 696, 1)97 [l08 
P.2d 1] ; Balconades Ballroom v. 8uperior Court, 109 nal.App. 
612 [293 P. 631] ; 8mith v. 8uperior Court, 21 Cal.App~2d 
160 [69 P.2d 176]; Archer v. 8uperior Court, 81 Cal.App. 
742 [254 P. 939] ; MacPherson v. 8uperior Court, 22 Cal.App. 
2d 425, 432 [71 P.2d 91] ; see also Golden Gate Tile Co. v. 
8uperior Court, 159 Cal. 474, 477 1114 P. 978] ; cases in other 
jurisdictions collected in 4 A.L.R. 582 ; 82 A.L.R. 1163; Ferris, 
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, § 300. 
In the early case of Temple v. 8uperior Court, 70 Cal. 211 
[11 P.699], this court held that mandamus should issue to 
compel a trial court to hear and determine a proceeding to 
have a person adjudged guilty of contempt, although the 
trial court had dismissed the proceeding "on the ground of 
want of jurisdiction" because the case came within Code 
of Civil Procedure section 336. The court stated in that 
case that "We have examined the record, and are of the 
opinion that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the 
court. The facts stated' bring the case clearly within section 
1210 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and under such circum-
stances the court cannot, by holding without reason that it 
has no jurisdiction of the proceeding, divest itself of jurisdic-
tion. aml evaot' the duty of hl'aring and det~rlllininJ! it.." 
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(70 Cal. 211-212.) That case has been followed in illllumer-
ahlp cases including Hennessy v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 368 
[228 P. 862J, where this court granted mandamus to hear a 
motion to tax costs, when the trial court denied the motion for 
lack of jurisdiction. The court considered the question of the 
availability of mandamus at length and quoted the following 
language from Cahill v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. 42, at 46 
[78 P. 467], "The code provides that the writ of mandate may 
be issued to compel the performance of an act which the law 
specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office. (Code 
Civ. Proc. sec. 1085.) The law specially enjoins upon the 
superior court, and upon the judge thereof, the duty of 
hearing and determining all matters which are within its 
jurisdiction and which come properly before it. The motion 
under consideration did come properly before that court, 
but the judge decided, as a matter of law ... that the court 
had no power in any case to make orders of the kind there 
applied for, and upon that ground only refused to proceed 
to the merits of the application. If the person holding office 
could thus decide what were the duties pertaining thereto 
which the law specially enjoins him to perform, the writ of 
mandate would be practically useless. The decision refusing 
to act which gives occasion for the writ would also furnish 
sufficient cause for denying it." 
Nor is the opinion of the District Court of Appeal in Brock 
v. Superior COU1·t, 119 Cal.App. 5, 6 [5 P.2d 659], inconsistent 
with these principles. In the Brock case, the trial court had 
entered an order denying an application for attorney fees, 
costs, and temporary support of a minor child. The District 
Court of Appeal stated that "Petitioner claims that the court 
hilS refused to exercise its jurisdiction in the matter, but the 
facts stated in the petition show the contrary. When the order 
to show cause came before the cburt the matter was submitted 
upon a stipulation of facts. Thereupon the court entered an 
order denying the requested relief, 'on account of this Court 
not having jurisdiction to award temporary attorney fees, 
costs or support on two grounds: that the child is not within 
the jurisdiction of this Court, also that provisions in Se('tion 
137 Civ. Code., in re Attorney's fees, costs and support money 
do not apply in this case.' " (119 Cal.App. 5, 6.) 
The trial court did not dismiss the proceeding but evidently 
gave a full hearing on the stipulated facts. It denied the 
relief requested by the applicant on the ground that it lacked 
) 
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authority to give the relief under the circumstances of the 
('.aBe. Since the petitioner was afforded the same hearing 
that he would have been entitled to had the trial court enter-
tained a different theory as to its jurisdiction, he was not 
entitled to mandamus to compel a new hearing. [1] Mandamus 
is available to compel the court to give a full hearing in the 
case before it, although it is not available to inform the trial 
court as to how it should rule with respect to the merits of 
the case. (Hilmer v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 71, 73 [29 P.2d 
175].) It follows that if the trial court has given the petitioner 
the full hearing to which he is entitled, mandamus will not 
ordinarily lie merely to correct the decision reached by the 
court, whether its decision be based on an erroneous concep-
tion of its own jurisdiction or an error of law. In the 
present ease, however, the respondent court has conceded that 
it did not give plaintiff a full hearing on his application, 
but dismissed the proceeding and refused to proceed with tht' 
hearing. This court should therefore issue the writ unless there 
is "a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law." (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086.) 
. [2] Nor does the fact that plaintiff might have appealed 
from the order of dismissal necessarily preclude his resort to 
mandamus. "The remedy by appeal, conceding that there is 
such, is not always an answer to a petition for mandamus. 
This writ must be issued when 'there is not a plain, speedy, 
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law' (sec. 
1086, Code Civ. Proc.) ; that the right of appeal is not always 
a speedy or adequate remedy is well settled." (Christ v. 
Superior Court, 211 Cal. 593, 595 [296 P. 612]; Lloyd v. 
Superior Court, 208 Cal. 622, 631 [283 P. 931J.) Thus, in 
Hennessy v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. 368, 374, this 
court held that "Conceding the order refusing to tax costs 
to be an appealable order, that alternative would not of itself 
be a sufficient reason for holding that remedy exclusive." (See 
also Archer v. Superior Court., 81 Cal.App. 742, 745 £254 P. 
939]. Other cases where the dismissal Was appealable include 
Times.Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.2d 309, 312 [44 
P.2d 547] ; Balconades Ballroom v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. 
App.612 [293 P. 631].) 
[3] Plaintiff alleges that an appeal would not be an 
adequate remedy in this case because of the pendency of the 
principal action for custody and divorce and because such 
an appeal would take at least a year, during which time he 
would not only be deprived of the custody of his child but 
) 
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would bc unable cven to sec th~ child, while the child woul<l 
lose all recollection of his fat])('r. It is uuquestiollcU that 
in the principal action the trial court refused to grant 
petitioner a hearing with respect to the custody of the child 
regardless of the relative fitness of himself or the defendant· 
and regardless of the interests of the child. This court has 
issued the alternative writ on the concessions of respondent 
that it was available if the court had jurisdiction. To deny 
the writ now on the grounds that plaintiff might appeal would 
require plaintiff to await the outcome of the principal action 
before perfecting his appeal. Meanwhile, he would be deprived 
of the custody of his child and the right to see it without a 
ht'aring as to the propriety 01 a custody order or of the. 
merits of his claim that defendant is unfit to have the care of 
the child. It therefore follows that the remedy of mandamus 
is available to plaintiff if respondent court had jurisdiction 
to determine the question of the custody of tht' child. 
[4] The trial court unquestionably had jurisdiction over 
the partit's, for by answering plaintiff's complaint on the 
merits dt'fendant waived any claim of lack of jurisdiction 
oyer her. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1014; Jardine v. Superior C01/,,.,, 
213 Cal. 301, 304 [2 P.2d 756, 79 A.L.R. 291J.) [5). This 
appearance, however, did not confer jurisdiction on the court 
over the subject matter of the action, for such jurisdiction 
may not be waived by a party or conferred on the court by 
eonst'nt. (Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71, 78 [218 P. 756, 51 
A.L.R. 1074] ; Harrington v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 185, 
191 [228 P. 15].) The question before this court, therefore, 
is whether respondent court has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the custody proceeding. (Dorman v. Friendly, 146 
Fla. 732, 737 [1 So .. 2d 734J ; Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 
Cal:-~,---40-t29P;2d~06]~) 
It mu~t be assumed that the child was domiciled in this 
state at the time of the commencement of. the proceeding in 
the trial court whether· the domicile of the child is based on 
that of the mother or that of the father.- Defendant con-
·The parties hal'e argued the question whether in California the domi-
eile of ehild after tbe separation of tbe parents remains that of the 
ehild '8 father or ill that of the parent with whieh it lives. Plaintiff eon· 
tends that Government Code, lIection 244 (d), providing that II The resi· 
dence of tbe father during his life ••. is the residence of the unmarried 
minor cbild" applies until thl' ('u!ttody of the child bas· been determined 
by a court of rompt'tent jurisdiction. On the other hand, defelldnnt, 
relying 011 Ch'iI Coo!', sections l!li. IllS, and 213, contends that Go'-crn-
JIlent Code, section 2-14 (d), applies only to the residence or domicile of a 
774 SAMPSELL V. SUPERIOR COURT [32 V.2d 
tl'luls that the chilU was domiciled ill Nevada on the grounuiS 
that defendant acquif'ed a Nevada domicile and that the 
domicile of the child was that of the mother. Under the 
allegations of the petition, however, the mother was still 
domiciled in Los Angeles County, California, at the time the' 
California proceeding was commenced." Since defendant 
has demurred to the alternative writ, the allegations of plain-
tiff's petition must be regarded as trup.. Moreover, plaintiff's 
complaint and his affidavit in support of the application for 
an order pendente lite contained similar allegations, and 
respondent court has refused to take jurisdiction to determine 
the correctness of these allegations. 
child whose parents have not separated. These sections provide that the 
father and mother of a legitimate child are equally entitled to its custody 
(§ 197); that after separation of the parents, the ":father, as such, has 
no rights superior to those of the wife and mother, in regard to the care, 
custody, education and control of the children of the marriage while such 
husband and wife live separate and apart from each other" (§ 198) ; 
and that the parent entitled to the child '8 custody has a right to change 
the child's domicile. (§ 213.) There is authority in support of plain-
tiff's contention in Lv.ck v. Luck, 92 Cal. 653, 655 [28 P. 787], but that 
ease was decided before section 197 was amended to its present form 
(Stats. 1913, p. 52), and the opinion does not mention sections 198 and 
213. (Ct. Cole v_ Superior Court, 28 Cal.App. 1, 5-6 [151 P. 169], which 
also does not mention these sections.) Similar statutes have been inter-
prete~ to mean that, after separation, the child takes the domicile of 
the parent with whom it lives. (See 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 32.2; 
Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, p. 43; 5 Vernier, American Family Laws, 
p. 227.) This interpretation would be in accord with the rule applicable 
to the determination of the residence of the ehild under provisions of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code. (~17.1(a) (b).) 
"Her domicile in California continued until she acquired a new one, 
even though she may ha.e left California intending eventually to go to 
Utah and not to return to this state. A new domicile cannot be acquired 
nntil a person actually lives in a new state with the intention of 
remaining there. (Gov. Code, ~ 244; Bhodea v. Bhodea, 80 Cal. App. 
2d 723, 726 [182 P.2d 275]; County of Loa .Angeles -v.-Superior 
Court, 128 Cal.App. 522,1 528 [18 P.2d 112]; additional cases collected 
9 Cal.Jur. 834-835; cases in other jurisdictions collected, Kennan, Resi-
dence and DOulicile, ~~ 92, 93, 100, 118-122; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, 
133; 5 A.L.R. 296; 17 Am.Jur. 609-610; 28 C.J.S. 30.) Therefore, de-
fendant did not aequire a Nevada domicile simply because ee intended 
to reside in Utah. She could not have acquired a Utah domicile at the 
time the complaint in the divorce action was filed or at the time of her 
appearance in that action, for she had not then gone to Utah to live. 
Whether defendant may now be domiciled in Utah is immaterial to the 
question of jurisdiction, for if the trial court had jurisdiction at the 
time of the commencement of the action, such jurisdiction could not be 
lost by any subsequent change of residence or domicile. Jurisdiction once 
acquired is not defeated by subsequent action of the parties. (Maloney v. 
Maloney, 67 Cal.App.2d 278, 280 [154 P.2d 426]; Boberts v. BobeTts, 
300 Ky. 454 [189 S.W.2d 691]; additional eases eolleeted 171 A.LoR •• 
1405.) 
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Defendant, relying on De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 
112 Cal. 101 [44 P. 345, 53 Am.St.Rep. 165, 32 L.R.A. 82] ; 
In re Chandler, 36 Cal.App.2d 583 [97 P.2d 1048] ; and Ma-
loney v. Maloney, 67 Cal.App.2d 278 [154 P.2d 4261, con-
tends that rpgardless of the child's domicile a court of this 
state has no jurisdiction of a child custody proceeding if the 
child is not physically present within the state at some time 
during the pendency of the action. Although there is language 
in the De La Montanya case, supra at 110-111, that is critical 
of the theory that the domicile of the child alone provides a 
satisfactory basis for jurisdiction of the subject matter since 
the child might be domiciled in this state without ever having 
lived here (c/. Titcomb v. Superior Court, supra 220 Cal. at 
42), the actual holding of that case relates to the question 
of persona] jurisdiction over the parties. It was held that the 
question of custody is not solely one of status and cannot be 
decided by a court unless it has personal jurisdiction over 
both parents. It was further held that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as construed 
in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [24 L.Ed. 565], constructive 
service was insufficient to give the court personal jurisdiction 
over a parent who was not present within the state although 
domiciled in California at the time of the commencement 
of the action. (C/. M~'lliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 [61 
S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357] ; cases collected 126 
A.L.R. 1474; Rest. Judgments § 16.) It is unnecessary to 
reexamine the holding of the De La Montanya case with 
respect to the problem of personal jurisdiction, for the 
defendant in this case submitted herself to the jurisdiction of 
respondent court. 
Defendant also relies on In re Chandler, supra, 36 Cal.App. 
2d 583, 585, for the proposition that jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the custody of children in divorce actions 
depends on the physical presence of the children in the state. 
According to the opinion in that case, however, the children 
were llot only absent from the state but had become domiciled 
in Texas before the action was commenced. Defendant, al-
though appearing in the divorce action, refused to obey an 
order of the court that he bring the children to California. 
He was held in contempt by the trial court, but on petition 
for habeas corpus the district court of appeal ordered bim 
discharged from custody on the ground that the order was 
void. The trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject 
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mattf'r of the custody of the chilllrell, for thl'Y ",ert' domiciled 
and present in anothl'r state d1lrin:! thl' pendl'IH'y of thE' 
action. ]n th(' courSl' of its opinioll til .. court stated that 
"Respond('nt eoncedrs tllnt it is well SP1tll'l] that onr ('ourts 
have 110 authority to award custody of children lIot within 
their territorial jurisdiction ... " (In re Chundl£r, supra 
at p. 583.) Not only was reference to this concession Ullllf'('!'S' 
sary to the decision, hut a similar statement in lV 01'r1'11 v. 
Warren, 127 Cal.App. 231, 240 [15 P.2d 556] was disapprovpd 
by this court in Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 729 [68 P.2d 
719]. 
Both parties have relied on Maloney v. Maloney, 67 Cal.App. 
2d 278, 280 [154 P.2d 426]. In that case both parents and th(' 
child were domiciled in California and were actually living 
within this state until, during the course of a divorce action, 
the plaintiff left the state taking the children wHh him. It 
was held that the removal of the children did not deprivc 
the trial court of jurisdiction to determine their custody. 
Nor did the plaintiff, by leaving the state, deprive thr court 
of personal jurisdiction over him. "The court thereafter hnd 
the power to enter an effective judgment for him or against 
him, in personam, relative to any substantial allegation of the 
pleadings. . . , Plaintiff cannot question the jurisdiction 
which by his own act he conferrcd. Although the children 
are beyond the territorial limits of California, they are sti11 
under the jurisdiction of the court below (Hersey v. H erse]J, 
271 Mass. 545 [171 N.E. 815, 818, 70 A.L.R. 518]), which 
attached at the time the suit was filed." (Maloney v. Maloney, 
supra at 280.) 
Insofar as the foregoing statement from the Maloney case 
shows a submission to the personal jurisdiction of the court 
by the plaintiff it cannot be questioned. [6] Defendant con-
tends that the court also held that plaintiff submitted the 
subject matter of the children's custody to the jurisdiction of 
th" trial court, A party, however, cannot confer upon a 
court jurisdiction over the subject matter that it dof's not 
already have (Taylor v. Taylor, SlIl)ra. 192 Cal. 71. 78; Hnr-
rington v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 185, 191 [228 P. 15). The 
trial court in the Maloney case had jurisdiction over the 
subject matter because the children were domiciled and liv-
ing in California at the time the action was commenced, and 
the mere physical absrlH'l' of tlll' ('hiltlren from the stntf' durin:! 
a part of thr trial dill lIot ll"pri,,!' tIll' COllrt of jllrisl~i('jioll. 
In the prl'l)ent ease the child was dOlllicilcd in tbis stat\' at 
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the time thr action was cOlllmenced b1lt was not living here. 
Thus, neither the Malolwy C8!;!' nor thc Chandler case are 
determinative of the qUl's! iOIl whet }I('r t hI' domicile of the 
child in this case presC'nts 8 sutncirnt basis for jurisdiction 
over the child's custody. 
Several tlll'ories have been advanced with respect to the 
correct basis for jurisuictioll over the subject matter of a 
child custody proceeding. According to one theory jurisdiction 
over children's custody is based on it! personam jurisdiction 
over the children'sparents. (Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va. 
124, 126 [81 S.E. 706).) Anothrr theory regards the question 
of custody as simply OlIe of statns and as such subject to the 
control of the courts of the state where the child is domiciled. 
(Rest. Conflicts, 117, 148; see Goodrich, Custody of Children. 
7 Corn L.Q. 1, 2; 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, p. 717; Dorman 
v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 740 [1 So.2d 734].) A third theory 
requires the child to be physically presC'nt within the state, on 
the ground that the basic probh'm before the court is to de-
termine what the best interest of the child is, and the court 
most qualified to do so is the one having access to the child. 
(See Stumberg, Children and Conflict of Laws, 8 Univ.Chic. 
L.Re\". 42. 55-56; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, p. 299; Sheehy 
v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 225 [186 A. 1, 107 A.L.R. 635].) 
There is, of course, no question that the courts of a 
particular state have jurisdiction to dE'termine the child's 
custody if the court has jurisdiction in personam over both 
parents, and the child is both physically present and domi-
ciled within the state. The court then has a substantial basis 
for determining not only the rights of the parents but what 
the best interest of the child is. All the basic elements in 
each of the foregoing theories are present. Difficulties have 
been encountered, however, when one or more of these ele-
ments are lacking. 
It is apparent that each of the foregoing theories, if re-
garded as exclusive tests of jurisdiction. ignores important 
considerations underlying the other theories. It would, how-
ever, be no solution of the problem to require all these elf'-
ments to be present before a court could acquire jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately cases will aris(' where one or two elements are 
lacking, and some court must have jurisdiction in thE' interest 
of the child to make proper provision for its custody. The 
principal difficulty with each of thp theories as exclusive tests 
of jurisdiction is thc difficlllt~· inbE'rf'nt in an;\" attE'mpt to 
apply hard and fast ru)('s of rt>!'; jl1c1irllta and couflict of laws 
) 
/ 
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to the problem of child custody. The pri~cipal cases and 
most of the secondary authorities have been concerned It>ss 
with the question whether a court has jurisdiction than with 
the question whether the courts of other states are bound by 
the particular decision, when that jurisdiction has been 
exercised. The respective theories are based on the assump-
tion that in order to achieve finality in this matter one court 
at one given time must have an exclusive right to deMrmine 
the issue. "From a standpoint of expediency and of achiev-
ing socially desirable ends, there seems to be only one argu-
ment in favor of confining jurisdiction to a single state; that 
it will produce stability and discourage the crossing of state 
lines to avoid the effect of unpalatable custody decrees." 
(Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State 
Lines, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 819, 830.) It is doubtful, 
however, whether the best interest of the child, the paramount 
consideration in custody proceedings, is served thereby. 
There is authority for the proposition that courts of two 
or more states may have concurrent jurisdiction over the 
custody of a child. (Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431 
[148 N.E. 624, 40 A.L.R. 937]; Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 
Tex. 139, 145-147 [112 S.W.2d 165. 116 A.L.R. 1293] ; Stal-
IQrd v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 806 [155 S.W.2d 2201.) In the 
interest of the child, there is no reason why the state where 
the child is actually living may not have jurisdiction to act 
to protect the child's welfare, and there is likewise no reason 
why other states should not also have jurisdiction. As stated 
by Justice Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431 [148 
N.E. 624, 40 A.L.R. 937], "The jurisdiction of a State to 
regulate the custody of infants found within its territory 
does not depend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its 
origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or 
helpless. (Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen (Mass.) 321, 323; 
White v. White, 77 N.H. 26 [86 A. 353] ; Hanrahan v. Sears, 
72 N.H. 71, 72 [54 A. 702] ; Matter 01 Hubbard, 82 N.Y. 90, 
93.) For this, the residence of the child suffices though the 
domicile be elsewhere. (Matter 01 Hubbard, supra.) But the 
limits of the jurisdiction are suggested by its origin. The 
residence of the chUd may not be used as a pretence for the 
adjudication of the status of parents whose domicile is else-
where, nor for the definition of parental rights dependent 
upon status. (CI. Kline v. Klme, 57 Iowa 386 [10 N. 825, 
42 Am.Rep. 47]; Griffin \'. GrifJin. 95 Ore. 78 [187 P. 598] ; 
Lamung v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310 [99 S.W. 542, 123 Am.St. 
J 
Oet.1948] SAMPSELL V. SUPERIOR COUBT 
(32 C.lId 783; 19'1 P.2d 739] 
779 
Rep. 809, 10 L.R.A. N.S. 690] ; Blackinton v. Blackinton, 141 
Mass. 432, 436 [5 N.E. 830, 55 Am.Rep. 484]; Matter of 
Standish, 197 App.Div. 176 [188 N.V.S. 900].) Parents so 
situated must settle their eontroversies at home. Our courts 
will hold aloof when intervention is unneeessary for the wel-
fare of the child. " 
[7] Thus, if the child is living in one state but is domiciled 
in another, the courts of both states may have jurisdiction over 
the question of its custody. It does not follow, however, that 
the courts of both states willexercis('! that jurisdiction and 
reach conflicting results. The courts of one state may detf;!r-
mine that the other state bas a more substantial intE'rest in 
the child and leave the matter to be settled there. On the 
other band, if the jurisdiction of one state has been exercised 
over the child. there is no reason why, if the welfare of the 
particular child is a matter of real concern to the courts of 
another state, thos('! court.s may not alRo have jurisdiction, 
which might be exercised in thE' interest of the child "with 
respectful consideration to the prior determination of other 
courts similarly situated." (Stansbury, 10 Law and Contemp. 
Problems, supra, at pp. 830-831. SeE' Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. 
2d 719, 726 [68 P.2d 719) ; Titcomb v. Superior Court, supra, 
220 Cal. 34, 39.} In any event, there is no reason why courts 
of one statt' should not be able to •• assume with confidence 
that the courts of the othE'r jurisdiction will act with wisdom 
and sincerity in all matters pertaining to the welfare of this 
child." (Millerv. Schneider, (Tex.Civ.App.) 170 S.W.2d 301, 
303.) 
(8] The problem is not one of rendering custody decrees 
for the courts of other states to regard as final and con-
clusive determinations. Indeed such decrees are not given 
conclusive eti't'ct in our own courts. for under Civil Code, 
Rt'ction 138, the court granting the decree "may at any time 
modify or vaca:e the same." In order to avoid interminable 
and vexatious litigation it is generally required that before 
modification or vacation of such a decree "there must be a 
change of circumstances arising after the original decree is 
entered, or at IE'ast a showing that facts were unknown to 
the party nrging them at the time of tht> prior order ... " 
(Olson v. Olson, 91) Cal.App. 594. 597 f272 P. 1113]. quoted 
with approval in Foster v. Foster, supra. 8 Ca1.2d 719. 726.) 
'Vhatever proof ma~' be requirE'd for a modification or vllca-
tion of a custody decree, it is not a final juogmt>nt. (Cooney 
) 
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v. Cooney, 25 Ca1.2d 202,208 [153 P.2d 334].) As a matter 
of comity the courts of this state treat valid custody de-
crees of the courts of sister states with the same respect 
as custody decrees of California courts. (Foster v. Foster, 
supra at 728-729; Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34, 
89 (29 P.2d 206].) No more or less respect for California 
decrees is expected from the courts of other states. If the 
decrees of California courts with rt'spect to child custody are 
subject to modification or annulment in this state, they are 
likewise subject to modification or annulment in any state 
having jurisdiction o\'er the subject matter, for such a decree 
"has no constitutional claim to more conclusive or final effect 
in the State of the forum that it has in the State where ren-
dered." (New York v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 [67 S.Ct. 903, 
91 L.Ed. 1133, 1136J ; see Harper, Conflict of Laws, 47 CoI.L. 
Rev. 883, 907-909.) 
V [9] Since the courts of this state do not finally and con-
clusively determine custody in a divorce proceeding, there is 
no reason to attempt to arrive at some basis for jurisdiction 
that should be accepted as final and conclusive in all states. 
It is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction that the state "has a 
substantial interest in the welfare of the child or in the 
preservation of the family unit of which he is a part . . . 
and this jurisdiction may exist in two or more states at the 
same time." (Stansbury, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. supra 
at 831.) 
Since this is a proceeding in mandamus to determine only 
the question of whether the respondent court has jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the custody proceeding, we are 
not concerned at this time with the question of how the juris-
diction of the respondent court should be exercised or whether 
under the facts of this case, as they may be determined by 
the trial court, it would be proper for the trial court to refuse 
to determine the custody of the minor child in the pending 
proceeding. It is sufficient that the respondent court has 
jurisdiction to· hear petitioner's application for a custody 
award. It is likewise immaterial to the determination of this 
case whether defendant has been awarded custody of the child 
by a Nevada court. It may be assumed for the purposes of 
this decision that thE' temporary prpsencE' of the child in 
Ne,·ada provided a sufficiE'nt bac;is for a custody award and 
that the decree of the Nevada court was valid to thE' extent that 
it determinE'd the child 's custod~'. (Finlay v. Fi111nll .. ~lIpro, 
240 N.Y. 429, 431; ct. Rest. Conflicts, § 118.) [10] Such a 
) 
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decree docs not deprive the California courts of jurisdictioD 
over the child (see Titcomb v. Superior Court, supra, 220 
Cal. 34, 39) for the state of domicile, where the child has 
Jived most of its life, clearly has as substantial an interest in 
the child's welfazoe as a state in which the child', presence 
was merely temporary. 
[11] The fact that the child is now living in Utah, where V 
it was taken by defendant sometime after the commencement 
of the present action, likewise does not deprive the respond-
ent court of jurisdiction over the child', custody. The re-
spondent court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter~ 
of the custody of· the child while the child was clearly domi-
ciled within this state. by subsequent change in the child'a 
abode is relevant only to the determination of how the court's 
jurisdiction should be exercised with due regard for the wel-
fare and best interest of the child. That question cannot be 
decided on the basis of the meager facts now before this 
court, even if it were proper in a mandamus proceeding to 
determine how the trial court should exercise its jurisdiction. 
The trial court therefore has jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the custody proceeding and of the parties thereto 
and must proceed with the hearing on the order to show 
cause why an order pendente lite should not be granted. 
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
Gibson, O. J., Edmonda; J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J .-1 dissent. 
The primary question in this case is whether under the 
circumstancessbown we shall use mandamus to compel a 
trial court to reverse an order dismissing a proceeding before 
it. This is not a case where the court simply refused to 
exercise jurisdiction at all; it is not a case where a mooted 
proceeding is left pending· and undisposed of; here the court 
did exercise its jurisdiction in the premises upon the facts 
which it found, upon the evidence before it, in the way which 
it concluded was legally correct, and which finally and com-
pletely disposed of the particular proceeding before it. The 
majority opinion, taking a different view of the evidence and, 
seemingly, a different VJew of the law (although this last 
proposition must necessarily be conjectural, since· the majority 
draws inferences from the evidence different from those im-
pliedly drawn by the trial court), reverses the trial court's 
order dismissin& an order io show cause. 
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In the exercise of its jurisdiction the trial court had issued 
the order to show cause, had set a date for hearing thereon, 
had proceeded with the hearing, had considered evidence 
from both parties, had impliedly found, upon ample evidence, 
that before the proceeding had been commenced the defendant 
in that action (the former wife of petitioner) had left Cali-
fornia, taking with her the minor child of such defendant 
and petitioner and had established for herself and child a 
domicile outside of California. The trial court had also im-
pliedly found, and there is no room for serious question as to 
the sufficiency of the evidence, that the defendant and the 
child had at all times subsequent to their original departure 
from California remained outside of this state and that the 
defendant refused to return to California and refused to 
bring, or to permit anyone to bring, the minor child from its 
new domicile into California. The evidenee as to the fixed 
intent of the defendant wife to permanently relinquish her 
domicile in California and to live elsewhere is undisputed. 
In the light of the recited facts the trial court concluded 
that no useful purpose would be subserved by hearing further 
evidence as to the claims of the plaintiff for an order tem-
porarily, pending trial of the case on its merits, awarding the 
custody of the child, or visiting rights, to him, and, accord-
ingly, entered its order dismissing the proceeding. It is such 
order of dismissal which the majority opinion by mandamus 
reverses. 
Such holding marks a complete about face by this court as 
to its policy in respect to the use of mandate as a substitute 
for appeal, and, if we are to have any intelligible thread of 
consistency in our law on this subject, must be understood as 
overruling lI{ncoln v. Superior Court (1943), 22 Cal.2d 304 
[139 P.2d 13], and Brock v. Superior Court (1931), 119 
Cal.App. 5 [5 P.2d 659]. If there be any ground at all for 
. distinguishing between Lincoln and the case at bar it is that 
in Lincoln we had a more persuasive case for reversal of the 
order of dismissal than here. In that case, as here, an order 
to show cause was issued and came on for hearing. There 
(p. 307 of 22 Ca1.2d), "the defendant husband filed a written 
motion 'to vacate, set aside and quash the order to show cause 
and affidavit' and declared that he 'objects to the hearing of 
said order to show cause.' The defendant's written motion 
specified two grounds: (1) that the superior conrt was 'with-
out jurisdiction to procrcd witI] thr hearing on saill order 
to show cause by reason of the fact t}lat thl'rE' is anotllPl" action 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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[the Virginia suit] pending between the above [p. 308] 
named plaint.iff and defendant covering the identical subject 
matter'; and (2) that 'the matters to which the defendant 
... is directed to appear and show cause are res adjudicata' 
by virtue of the Virginia procerdings." As to such two grounds 
of objection to the hearing we frankly and specifically held 
that" Neither of such grounds raises a jurisdictional point," 
thereby recognizing that the trial court erred in granting the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. We there held, however, con-
trary to the view now contended for by petitioner, that the 
question of error in the ruling was not to be considered in 
ruling on the petition for mandamus; we confined ourselves 
to the question, which we then deemed controlling, as to 
whether the trial court in truth exercised, or refused to exer-
cise, its jurisdiction. 
In passing on that controlling issue we said: "It is patent 
in the record that the superior court had jurisdiction of the 
cause and of the parties. It is likewise patent that the court 
exercised that jurisdiction by issuing its order directing the 
defendant to appear and show cause why he should not be 
required to make the payments and do the things recited in 
the order, by conducting the hearing on the order, by receiv-
ing and considering evidence, and by entertaining and grant-
ing a motion to dismiss." Every statement of the above 
quotation is equally true in relation to the case at bar. Here 
the petition for the writ alleges that with the evidence (here-
inafter epitomized) before it the trial court "refused to pro-
ceed with the hearing on the said Order to Show Cause, and 
made a minute order which reads and provides as follows: 
'Motion of attorney for defendant to dismiss Order to Show 
Cause for lack of jurisdiction is granted.''' (Italics added.) 
The cogent force of the Lincoln holding in its direct appli-
cability to the order here involved is· made still further ap-
parent by thefollo,*ing language in Lincoln (p. 309 of 22 
Ca1.2d): "The petition herein discloses that in addition to 
the written motion to quash the order to show cause the de-
fendant . . . made an oral motion to dismiss the proceeding 
and that such motion to dismiss was granted. If the defendant 
in the trial court had confined himself to an objection to the 
proceeding therein, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, 
and if that court had merely snstained such objrction and 
lett tllf~ proceedinu ~till pending, we shonld have an essen-
tially different case: there would then appear a failure to 
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exercise jurisdiction. But on the showing made the superior 
court did not stop there. Upon defendant's application it 
dismissed the proceeding. The effect is the same, so far as 
this mandamus application is concerned, as though the suit 
had been dismissed . . . That the trial judge in the case here 
involved may have believed that the Virginia court had exclu-
sive jurisdiction is inconsequential. A mere belief in an erro-
neous proposition of law cannot oust a court of jurisdiction 
and does not establish a refusal to act. If the trial court here 
had acted in accordance with such a belief and merely sus-
tained an objection to proceeding with the hearing, we should 
have a proper factual base, jurisdictionally, for the interven-
tion of mandate. But we are concluded on this phase of the 
case by the fact that the court, regardless of what its theory 
may have been, in the action it took exercised its jurisdiction." 
Here, as previously stated, the court exercised its juris-
diction in the premises by issuing the order to show cause, 
by conducting a hearing thereon and by making an order 
completely disposing of such order to show cause. Whether 
such order is correct or erroneous is, as it was held in Lincoln, 
not properly before us. But, in view of the argument made on 
behalf of petitioner, and to demonstrate that the court did 
exercise jurisdiction and discretion in the premises rather 
than simply refuse to act, it seems proper to note the evi-
dence on which it acted. The evidence before the court in-
cluded the affidavit of the plaintiff; it included the order of 
issuance of the order to show cause and it included the plain-
tiff's complaint and the defendant's answer thereto. From the 
sworn allegations in such documents the trial court was amply 
justified, if not as a matter of law compelled, to find that 
defendant left California in October, 1946, taking with her 
the minor child, and that at the time she left California she 
had the fixed and definite intention to cease to be a resident 
of California and to establish and maintain her residence 
permanently outside the boundaries of California. Accord-
ingly the trial court was amply justified, if not as a matter 
of law compelled, to find that at the time the order to show 
cause was issued (July 8, 1947, and, if it be material, at the 
time plaintiff commenced his action, JanulLl'Y 2, 1947) the 
defendant's domicile and that of the child had ceased to be in 
California. 
From the record presented by plaintiff, who is petitioner 
here, it appears without dispute that plaintiff and defendant 
separated on June 3, 1946; that plaintiff'. complaint (com-
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mencing the litigation here involved) was filed on January 
2, 1947; "that the defendant Gladys J. Sampsell left the 
State of California on October 25, 1946, with the avowed in-
tention of obtaining a Nevada divorce and thereafter marry-
ing William Bolt and residing with him at his residence in 
Salt Lake City. [Italics added.] Six weeks thereafter, and 
on December 11, 1946, she sued petitioner in Nevada for a 
divorce, and served him by publication ... On June 7,1947, 
tke defendant Gladys J. Sampsell carried out her original 
stated intention by marrying William Holt in Carson City, 
Nevada, and removing to Salt Lake City, where she has since 
resided with him. [Italics added.] On July 8,1947, petitioner 
filed an affidavit in support of an order to show cause for a 
pendente lite determination of the minor child'a custody, 
and such order to show cause was issued and made returnable 
on July 17, 1947, before the respondent Court." 
It is to be noted that the affidavit of plaintiff, which is a 
part of the evidence which was before the trial court when 
it entered its order of dismissal, apecifically avers that "prior 
to the 25th day of October, 1946, defendant stated to plain-
tiff that she was going to divorce him and marry one WILLIAM 
HOLT, who resided in Salt Lake City, Utah, and on the 25th 
day of October, 1946, said defendant, without the,knowledge 
or consent of plaintiff, left the County of Los Angeles, State 
of California, where both plaintiff and defendant had resided 
since their respective childhoods, with the said minor child 
of plaintiff and defendant, and went to the City of Las Vegas, 
State of Nevada. That thereafter plaintiff requested that 
defendant return to the State of California with the said 
child, but t.he defendant has at all times failed, neglected; and 
refused to do so, and instead of returning and as soon as she 
had lived for six weeks in Las Vegas, Nevada, and on or about 
. __ ,._.~~,!lth day of December, 1946, defendant filed a divorce 
action against plaintiff in I the District Court of the State of 
Nevada, in and for the County of Clark. That ser\ice by pub-
lication in said divorce action was attempted on plaintiff, but 
that plaintiff did not appear in said action, and plaintiff was 
never personally served in said action, for the reason that tile 
State of California was the true domicile of the said parties· 
• A roere conclullion of the affiant, 80 far as doroicile of the defendant 
and of the ehild ill concerned, and incompetent to constitute a substantial 
conflict in the ohjective facts from which their domicile is to be inferred. 
(John8ton v. Benton (1925), 73 Cnl.App. 56;j, 570 [239 P. 60].) 
) 
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aliI.! the place where any divorce litigation should be main-
tained, and for the further reason that plaintiff did not have 
tlw facilities and his employment did not permit his travelling 
to the State of Nevada to defend and cross-complain in said 
action .•.. 4. On or about the 7th day of June, 1947, in 
Carson City, Nevada, the defendant Gladys J, Sampsell mar-
ried the William Holt whom she stated to affiant that she 
intended marrying, before going to the State of Nevada to 
obtain her said divorce, and since said time said William Holt 
and said defendant have been living together in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, as man and wife. 
"5. That prior to said marriage, defendant continued to 
maintain a place of temporary abode in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
and has never had any intention of making the State of Nevada 
her permanent place of abode. That the only intention de-
fendant had was to divorce plaintiff in the State of Nevada, 
and then remove to the City of Salt Lake City, Utah, after 
marrying William Holt, and relide with him in his residence 
in said last named city, and that the said William Holt has 
at all times maintained and conducted his business in the said 
City of Salt Lake City, Utah, and has never resided or in-
tended to reside in the State of Nevada. [Italics added.] 
"6. That during all of the times herein mentioned since 
the defendant went to the State of Nevada, she has maintained 
the minor child of plaintiff and defendant with her, and has 
refused to permit plaintiff to have any custody of the child 
whatsoever, or to see the said child, or to permit the child to 
be returned to the State of California . . ." 
From the ab~e quoted evidence it is obvious that the trial 
court justifiably found that defendant, with the child, had 
departed from California and had ceased to be domiciled 
therein long before the disputed order to show cause was 
issued. Regardless of whether defendant intended to live in 
Nevada permanently it is clear that she intended to leave 
California permanently. Theltrial court so found and there-
upon dismissed the order to show cause. That was a proper 
exercise, not a refusal to exercise, the jurisdiction of the 
subject matter which it possessed. (Lincoln v. Superior Court 
(1943), supra, 22 Cal.2d 304, 309, 315.) But even if we 
could hold that the court erred in dismissing the order to show 
cause on the facts and theory above stated it is still inescapable 
that at the worst it ('rred in the E'xercise of jurisdiction. That 
was, precisely, the situation in Lincoln and in Lincoln we held 
that we would not use mandamus to correct such an error. 
) 
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It is further to be noted here that it is only the pf'nliente 
lite order to show cause that has been dismissed. The action 
still pends.Many times, a trial court in handling domestic 
relations litigation has occasion to exercise its jurisdiction 
and its sound discretion in respect to applications for awards 
of custody of minor children pendente lite by denying such 
applications and postponing any order as to custody until the 
case is tried on its merits. In fact, the usual rule is that in 
the absence of some substantial showing requiring a change 
for the protection of a chUd, the courts will leave custody 
where they find it until trial on the merits is had. 
An application for an award of custody of minor children, 
as an incident to divorce litigation, is, like an application 
for alimony pendente lite, in effect a proceeding for a sepa-
rate judgment which may be made independent of, or preced-
ing, or subsequent to, the final judgment. Although a provi-
sion for custody of the minor children may be included in 
either or both the interlocutory and final decrees, the pro-
vision for the custody (and support) of the children may be 
modified from time to time upon proper showing, regardless 
of finality of the decrees otherwise. The application for award, 
or for modification, of custody, may be heard and determined 
upon a record of its own and may be the subject of a direct 
appeal. The order of dismissal of the order to show cause was 
a final determination of that proceeding (Lincoln v. Superior 
Oourt (1943), supra, 22 Ca1.2d 304, 809), subject, of course, 
to the right of the plaintiff to make a similar new application, 
upon proper grounds, at any time during the minority of 
the child (Civ. Code, § 188). It may be said here as was said 
in the Lincoln case (p. 314), "[T]he only objects that would 
be attained by granting the writ . . . would be to require 
the trial judge (1) to reverse his ruling in granting the 
motion to quash and the motion to dismiss, and (2) to resume 
the hearing of the order to show cause and dispose of it either 
differently as to result or on a different ground. In other 
words, the legal objective sought to be attained by the writ 
is not to compel the trial court to hear and determin~ a cause, 
but rather to compel it to rehear and redetermine and reversr 
its ruling on a question of law [and in this case, apparently, 
its findings of facts] in a cause it has heard and determined. 
That it might on such rehearing receive additional pvidencp, 
or give difff'rent legal effect to the evidence it had received, 
is beside the point." 
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A case which is also squarely in point is Brock v. Superior 
Court (1931), supra, 119 Cal.App. 5,6, wherein the following 
appears: "Petitioner claims that the court has refused to 
exercise its jursdiction in the matter, but the facts stated in 
the petition show the contrary. When the order to show cause 
came before the court the matter was submitted upon a stipu-
lation of facts. Thereupon the court entered an order denying 
the requested relief, 'on account of this Court not having 
jurisdiction to award temporary attorney fees, costs, or sup-
port on two grounds; that the child is not within the juris-
diction of this Court, also that provisions in Section 137, 
Civ. Code., in re Attorney's fees, costs and support money 
do not apply in this case. ' 
"It thus appears that the court did not deny its jurisdic-
tion to pass upon the application. It did pass upon and deter-
mine said application, but refused the requested allowance, 
because the court was of the opinion that it did not have 
authority to make such allowance to a child not residing in 
this state and not present in this state, in an action to compel 
a father to support his child. If the court erred in this con-
clusion (which we do not decide), it was only an error made 
by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It was not a 
refusal to action upon the merits of the matter presented. 
"The petition for writ of mandate is denied." 
The petitioner would have us hang the weight of a mandated 
reversal of the dismissal on the tenuous thread of an assump-
tion, contrary to all the established objective facts and con-
trary to the trial court's implied finding, that the minor child, 
notwithstanding the valid award of custody to his mother by 
the Nevada court and notwithstanding her admittedly perma-
nent residence in Utah, is a "domiciliary" of California and 
therefore, subject to jurisdiction which, the majority hold, 
the superior-court" refused" to exercise when, after consid-
ering the evidence pertinent to its jurisdiction of the res and 
its practical power to enforce any order it might make, it dis-
missed the order to show cause. The most that can be claimed 
for the California court, on any view of the evidence, is a 
fringe of partihl jurisdiction. To compel the trial court to 
reverse its pri, .. r order of dismissal, to resume the hearing, 
and, presumptively, to award custody of the child or visiting 
privileges to the plaintiff pending trial on the merits, with 
only partial and inadequate jurisdiction or power to enforce 
its order, seems to me to be an abuse of the power of this 
court and of mandamus procedure. "Complete jurisdiction 
) 
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includes not only the power to hear and determine, btlt the 
power to enforce the determination, as the judgment or de-
cree is the end for which jurisdiction is exercised, and it is 
only through the judgment and its execution that the power of 
the court is made efficacious and its jurisdiction complete. To 
render the jurisdiction of a court complete, it must have jur-
isdiction over the subject matter, and in actions in personam 
over the person, or in proceedings in rem over the res or 
matter in contest." (21 C.J.S. 35, § 21, and cases there cited.) 
In 14 American Jurisprudence 364, section 160, it is said 
that •• Complete jurisdiction includes not only the power to 
hear and determine the cause, but also power to enforce the 
judgment; and courts usually decline to entertain or to 
attempt to exercise jurisdiction intended to be complete if 
it fails to confer power to enforce the judgment which may be 
rendered ... [pp. 373-374, § 174] A court having juris-
diction to render a judgment or decree has authority and 
jurisdIction to mue such orders and issue such writs as may 
be necessary and essential to carry the judgment or decree 
into effect and render it binding and operative ... [A] court 
will not adjudicate where it cannot enforce the adjudication 
. . ." In the simplest and most concise language the supreme 
court of Connecticut says (Bankers' Trust 00. v. Greims 
(1929), 110 Conn. 36 [147 A. 290, 66 A.L.R. 726, 731]): 
"It is a fundamental principle that courts will not adjudicate 
when they cannot enforce." It seems to me that, even if we 
assume that the trial court could in some practical manner 
(which has not yet been suggested) enforce an order for 
custody pending the tlial, we should not, under the circum-
stances here shown, apply mandamus to compel it to reverse 
the order made. . We, of course, do not know what order 
might be made after trial on the merits. 
Here, both the minor child and his mother, with whom he 
lives in Utah, are outside the territorial boundaries of Cali~ 
fornia and are domiciled outside California. It is true that 
the mother has .. appeared" in the present California pro-
ceeding by the filing of an answer to the complaint through 
an attorney. But neither the mother nor the child is physically 
within the State of California and neither is within reach 
of the sheriff of a California county. The fact that the court 
has jurisdiction to render .an in personam judgment as against 
the mother does not mean that such judgment can be executed 
upon res beyond the boundaries of the state. The child is 
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not a party to the basic litigation, either plaintiff or defend-
ant, nor is he an intervenor, cross-complainant or cross-
defendant. By a process (If elimination, then, it would seem 
that his relationship to till: ('.asp insofar as an order awarding 
his custody is concerned, Jnost logically, is analogous to that 
of the res the status of which is to be litigated. "A court has 
no jurisdiction of rights or actions in rem where the property 
in controversy lies without the limits of the court's control 
and its process cannot reach the locus in quo . . ." (21 C.J .S. 
52, § 43.) It is unnecessary and would be improper for us 
to speculate here as to what could possibly be accomplished 
if the mother were physically within reach of California 
process and had been ordered to bring the child into the state. 
No such order has been made and neither the child nor the 
mother is available to the Rheriff in California. 
Upon the showing made the order of dismissal was within, 
and constituted an exercise of, the jurisdiction of the court. 
Contrary to a statement in the majority opinion that "If we 
were to hold that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction based 
on the facts stated in petitioner's affidavit is a determination 
on the merits precluding the issuance of mandamus" some 
11 California eases "would have to be overruled," an exam-
ination of the cited cases discloses no holding requiring 
that under circumstances such 88 are apparent here the 
writ must issue. There is broad language, somewhat loosely 
used in some of those eases, but the fact remains that Lincoln 
and Brock are the only two California cases squarely in point 
with the case at bar and those two cases, if we are to be con-
sistent, require that the writ be denied. 
Perhaps the most serious objection to the majority opinion, 
from the standpoint of the profession, is that it leaves the law 
relating to the use of mandamus as a substitute for appeal in 
such a confused state that no lawyer or judge will be able 
to differentiate intelligibly between eases where mandamus 
will lie to correct error in the exercise of jurisdiction and 
where it will be denied. I think it is clear that no lawyer or 
judge of a lower court can carefully read Lincoln (22 Ca1.2d 
304) and Brock (119 Cal.App. 5) and compare the court 
action and orders there made with the court action and order 
here made, and find any substantial legal basis or rule for 
distinguishing the earlier cases from this one. If the majority 
determine, as they do here, that our former rather strict 
policy against using mandate as a substitute for appeal is to be 
so broadly liberalized, it is my view that, for the sake of clarity 
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of the law with which others must. deal, they should frankly 
acknowledge that their opinion is essentially inconsistent with 
the earlier ones (Brock, 1931, and Lincoln, 1943) and un-
equivocally declare that those cases are overruled. 
For the several reasons hereinabove elucidated the applica-
tion for mandate should be denied. 
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
